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Memory as evidence of personal identity. A study on reincarnation beliefs 
 
Derek Parfit in his book “Reasons and Persons” writes: 
 
There might […] have been evidence supporting the belief in reincarnation. 
One such piece of evidence might be this. A Japanese woman might claim to 
remember living a life as a Celtic hunter and warrior in the Bronze Age. On 
the basis of her apparent memories she might make many predictions which 
could be checked by archaeologists. Thus she might claim to remember having 
a bronze bracelet shaped like two fighting dragons. And she might claim that 
she remembers burying this bracelet beside some particular megalith, just 
before the battle in which she was killed. Archaeologists might now find just 
such a bracelet buried in this spot, and their instruments might show that the 
earth had not here been disturbed for at least 2,000 years. This Japanese 
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In this chapter, I will not discuss whether such a case—should we really encounter 
it—would constitute evidence supporting the belief in reincarnation. In contrast to Parfit, my 
aim here is purely descriptive. I want to understand how people think about the role of 
memory claims in establishing facts about personal identity. 
In empirical literature, there is work on various questions dealing with folk reasoning 
about memory and personal identity. Is continuity of memory taken to be necessary for the 
continuity of personal identity (Blok, Newman and Rips 2005; Nichols and Bruno 2010)? 
How important are facts about possession of memories in reidentification of a person in 
reincarnation (White 2015; 2016a) or fission (Woike, Collard and Hood 2020)? What is the 
role of memory in convincing people that they have lived past lives (White, Kelly and 
Nichols 2016)? Existing work, however, does not look into the role of memory claims in 
establishing facts about personal identity. 
Let us thus distinguish between three descriptive questions that can be asked about 
Parfit’s imaginary case and others like it (e.g., Ayer 1956: 220), assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that such alternative explanations as a deliberate hoax are taken to be definitively 
ruled out. First, would these cases be taken to provide evidence supporting the belief in 
reincarnation? Second, if yes, would they provide evidence of personal identity retained 
through cycles of reincarnation? Third, what exactly in these cases would be taken to 
constitute such evidence? 
Let us briefly discuss these three questions. The answer to the first one plausibly 
depends on what alternative explanations are considered. In discussing Parfit’s case, Steven 
Hales claims that “there are indefinitely many […] hypotheses” that are superior explanations 
than reincarnation in a sense that they are consistent with our best current theories about the 
mind and physics in general, as well as being in principle empirically testable (2001 :342). 
He provides the following alternative hypothesis as an example: 
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[T]here are intelligent, technologically advanced extra-terrestrials who regard 
humans with great amusement, and secretly monitor and occasionally interfere 
with our lives. One thing they enjoy is performing super-advanced 
psychosurgery on select humans that provides these humans with quasi-
memories of having lived past lives, verifiably true beliefs about where 
ancient bracelets are hidden, and previously non-existent linguistic or musical 
talents. (ibid.) 
 
Alternatively, one may be willing to consider alternative supernatural explanations 
(Ducasse 1961: 300-304), like mediumistic communication (the Japanese woman 
communicates with (the spirit of) the Celtic warrior), possession (the spirit of Celtic warrior 
possesses the Japanese woman) or extrasensory perception (the Japanese woman has access 
to either the mind of the Celtic warrior or current facts about locations of buried artefacts). 
Thus, we can expect that the answer to the first question would depend both on what prior 
plausibility was assigned to the reincarnation hypothesis and also on what alternative 
hypotheses are salient in the context (and how much initial plausibility is assigned to them). 
Moving to the second question, the answer would depend on the precise 
understanding of reincarnation or rebirth. While the most familiar conception of reincarnation 
in Western culture seems to assume personal identity through cycles of reincarnation, this is 
arguably not the case in the Buddhist understanding of rebirth (Perrett 1987; Siderits 2015). 
Memories of past lives do not presuppose continuous personal identity, at least on the level of 
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the religious and philosophical doctrine, if not always on the level of folk 
conceptualizations.2 
Finally, and most centrally for this chapter, let’s look into the nature of evidence 
involved in such cases as Parfit’s. The only available systematic analysis of ethnographic 
evidence suggests that in cultures that have procedures of identification of reincarnates, these 
procedures tend to primarily focus on “physical marks that correspond to those on the 
deceased when they were alive […]; behavioral similarities that indicate similar personal 
traits […]; and the recognition of places or people the deceased knew” (White 2016b: 3-4). 
Furthermore, in a series of studies with participants from cultures that do not practice 
identification of reincarnates (Americans and Indian Jains), White gave the participants a 
story about a village in which the true reincarnation needs to be chosen from a number of 
candidates, each of whom has one feature in common with the deceased. She found that 
possession of memories and bodily marks were preferred cues in identifying reincarnated 
people (2015; 2016a). 
Now, memory comes in different kinds and flavors. Which aspect of it is taken to 
provide evidence of reincarnation? For ethnographic accounts, White claims that the 
recognition of places or people the deceased knew “assumes the continuity of episodic 
autobiographical memory” (2016b: 4). The same was true about empirical studies (White 
2015; 2016a), where presence of an episodic autobiographic memory (“He remembered 
seeing a shoe for the first time.”) was taken to constitute better evidence of reincarnation than 
 
2 Thus, when Claire White and her colleagues interpret eyewitness accounts of the selection procedures of the 
14th Dalai Lama (which included the boy correctly choosing the items that belonged to the late 13th Dalai Lama 
and also handling those objects in a distinctive fashion) in terms of essentialism about personal identity (White, 
Sousa and Berniunas 2014), they seem to underestimate the vast doctrinal resources available to the Tibetan 
bureaucrats. 
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the presence of a semantic (“He remembered the names of shoe parts.”) or a procedural (“He 
remembered how to mend shoes.”) memory. Autobiographic memory of past events, 
however, can also be semantic. Thus we can ask whether the reason why verifiable memory 
claims are considered to provide evidence for the belief in reincarnation is (otherwise 
unexplainable) possession of information about past events—a feature shared by both 
episodic and semantic memories—or rather some feature of memory claims that signals the 
presence of specifically episodic memories. 
I present two studies in which I look into these three questions. 
 
Study 1. Celtic warrior 
 
In the first study, I test whether (a) judgments of quality of evidence supporting the belief in 
reincarnation provided by Parfit’s Celtic warrior case depend on study participants’ initial 
beliefs about the possibility of reincarnation and also whether (b) evidence can be weakened 
by making alternative explanations salient.  
Participants. 300 study participants were recruited on Prolific: 63% female, 37% 
male, 1 person identified as non-binary, Mage = 37.0, age SD = 13.4, age range 18-75. In both 
studies reported in this chapter, participants were nationals of the USA or the UK who 
indicated English as their first language. 
Materials. Study participants were asked to read a short story based on Parfit’s 
scenario: 
 
A Japanese woman claims to remember living a life as a Celtic hunter and 
warrior in the Bronze Age. On the basis of her apparent memories, she makes 
many predictions which can be checked by archaeologists. For example, she 
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claims to remember having a bronze bracelet, shaped like two fighting 
dragons. And she claims that she remembers burying this bracelet beside some 
particular megalith, just before the battle in which she was killed. 
Archaeologists now find just such a bracelet buried in this spot, and their 
instruments show that the earth has not here been disturbed for at least 2,000 
years. This Japanese woman makes many other such predictions, all of which 
are verified. 
Suppose you learn that there indeed is a woman who (a) claims to remember 
living a life as a Celtic hunter and warrior in the Bronze Age and (b) many of 
the things she claims to have experienced are verified by archeologists. What 
would be your best explanation of what could be happening here? 
 
Study participants were asked to write a one or two sentence-long explanation and then 
proceeded to the next two tasks, provided in a counterbalanced order over the two subsequent 
pages. 
One of these tasks asked to suppose that it is shown that the woman is sincere in her 
claims, that she sincerely believes remembering the Bronze Age events, and then respond to 
the following two questions (in randomized order) on a scale from 1 (Completely unlikely) to 
7 (Very likely): 
 
[Identity]3 After learning of such a case, would you think that this woman in 
fact is the same person as the Celtic warrior? 
 
3 Labels in brackets (in both studies) were not shown to the participants. 
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[Memory] After learning of such a case, would you think that this woman in 
fact personally remembers (and not only thinks that she remembers) the 
Bronze Age events? 
 
In the other task, participants were provided with a list of attempts to explain what 
could be happening in this situation (in randomized order) and asked to indicate how 
plausible each attempted explanation is, on a scale from 1 (Totally implausible) to 7 (Very 
plausible): 
 
[Reincarnation] The Celtic warrior reincarnated as the Japanese woman. 
[Possession] The spirit of the Celtic warrior possessed the Japanese woman. 
[Telepathy] The Japanese woman had telepathic access to the mind of the 
Celtic woman. 
[Clairvoyance] The Japanese woman used clairvoyance to learn where various 
Bronze Age artefacts are. 
[Insertion] Technologically advanced extra-terrestrials planted memories of or 
true beliefs about past events they witnessed into the Japanese woman (for 
amusement or as an experiment). 
[Immortality] The Japanese woman was the same immortal being as the Celtic 
warrior. 
 
Half of the participants responded to identity and memory questions before 
considering alternative explanations, the other half in the opposite order. 
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On the next page, participants were asked to suppose again that there indeed is such a 
woman and then asked whether they would consider this to provide evidence in favour of a 
belief in reincarnation (on a scale from 1 ("No evidence") to 7 ("Very strong evidence")). 
Finally, on the next page, they were asked which of the following descriptions best 
captures what they think happens after we die (first three options provided in a randomized 
manner, “unsure” always last): 
 
[Annihilation] The person ceases permanently after the body dies. 
[Immortal soul] The person continues to exist as a soul after the body dies. 
[Reincarnation] After the body dies, the person continues to exist in a new 
body. 
[Unsure] I don’t know what happens to the person after the body dies. 
 
Results. 
Free text explanations. 70 percent of participants provided one explanation, 24 
percent - two explanations each, and a further 2 percent - three each. The remaining 4 percent 
did not provide any explanations either by saying that they have none or simply claiming that 
the story is false. 
Explanation in terms of reincarnation was mentioned most frequently, by 51 percent 
of participants. The second most common explanation was in terms of educated guess – 26 
percent of participants speculated that the reason why archaeologists were able to verify the 
claims is that the claims were based on familiarity with Celtic culture and history, e.g., 
general knowledge about types of Celtic jewelry or funerary rituals. 12 percent referred to 
precise knowledge. Most of these were in terms of testimony through family line (21 
participant), followed by access to an authentic written source, e.g., the Celtic warrior’s diary 
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(14). 10 indicated that the relevant knowledge was acquired via archaeological means, e.g., in 
a non-invasive way, like sonar or x-ray, which is compatible with ground not being disturbed. 
There were also 6 participants who referred to knowing or having information without 
specifying any details. 13 percent entertained a possibility of sheer coincidence, some 
referring to the fact, that if there are many people making claims, some are likely to be true, 
other referring to the claims being vague enough. Finally, 13 percent referred to various other 
supernatural explanations, such as ESP (8 participants), communication with spirits (5), 
messages in dreams (4), time travelling (3), genetic memory (3), collective consciousness (2), 
possession (2), being a multidimensional being (2) and a number of other explanations each 
mentioned by only one participant. 
Order effects. Ascriptions of identity were higher before (M = 3.54, SD = 1.97) than 
after evaluating alternative explanations (M = 3.00, SD = 1.92), t(298) = 2.40, p = .017, d = 
.28. The same was true for memory, Mbefore = 4.08, SD = 1.85, Mafter = 3.64, SD = 
1.92), t(298) = 2.04, p = .043, d = .24. Ascriptions of identity and ascriptions of memory were 
strongly correlated, r = .782, p < .001. 
Explanations. A mixed-effects model was fit with participants as a random factor, 
explanations and order of presentation as fixed factors, and plausibility as an outcome. There 
were differences in evaluations of plausibility between different explanations, F(1, 1490) = 
34.7, p < .001. Order of presentation did not affect evaluations (p = .545) nor was there an 
interaction between the two factors (p = .399). 
Post hoc pairwise comparisons suggest that reincarnation was taken to be a more 
plausible explanation than all the other five explanations (all pholm < .001), while extra-






Figure 1. Estimated marginal means for plausibility of each of the six explanations. Error 
bars indicate 95% CI. 
 
Principal component analysis using varimax rotation on the six explanations returned 
a two-factor solution that cumulatively explains 68 percent of variance. Factor 1 includes 
three explanations that presuppose the presence of the Celtic warrior in the Japanese woman: 
reincarnation (factor loading .874), immortality (.850), and possession (.717), explaining 38% 
of variance. Factor 2 includes three explanations that presuppose mental access to the 
relevant facts: insertion (.769), clairvoyance (.736), and telepathy (.681), explaining 30% of 
variance. When measures of memory and identity are also added, they strongly load in Factor 
1: identity - .914, memory - .853. 
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Quality of evidence. Evidence for reincarnation was on average judged to be 
inconclusive, no different from the middle of the scale, M = 3.99, SD = 1.95, t(299) = .09, p = 
.929. 
Afterlife beliefs. 9 percent of participants indicated that they believe that after the 
body dies, the person continues to exist in a new body (Reincarnation). 31 percent said that 
the person continues to exist as a soul after the body dies (Immortal soul). 29 percent said that 
the person ceases permanently after the body dies (Annihilation) while the remaining 31 
percent were unsure. 
Effect of afterlife beliefs. A series of one-way ANOVAs showed that afterlife beliefs 
were associated with responses to questions about how plausible an explanation in terms of 
reincarnation is, F(3, 296) = 27.9, p < .001, how good the evidence in favor of belief in 
reincarnation was taken to be, F(3, 296) = 22.5, p < .001, as well as with ascriptions of 
identity, F(3, 296) = 15.0, p < .001, and remembering, F(3, 296) = 15.3, p < .001. Estimated 
marginal means and pairwise comparisons are presented in Table 1 and Figure 2. The same 
pattern can be observed in all four cases. Scores are the highest in those who believe in 
reincarnation, closely followed by those who believe in the immortal disembodied soul, while 
scores are low in those who believe in annihilation. 
The same pattern of responses is also observed in looking at how frequently 
participants mention reincarnation as an explanation in free text responses. Reincarnation was 
mentioned by 85 percent of those who believe in reincarnation, 64 percent of those who 
believe an in immortal soul, and only 33 percent of those who believe in annihilation. Among 
those who were unsure, 45 percent mentioned reincarnation. Binomial logistic regression 
suggests that probability of mentioning reincarnation depended on the type of afterlife 
beliefs, χ2(3) = 32.6, p < .001. 
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Measure Group EMM 95% CI 
Immortality Annihilation Unsure 




Reincarnation 5.81 [5.10, 6.52] 2.97 .007** 7.62 <.001*** 5.70 <.001*** 
Immortality 4.60 [4.22, 4.97] - 6.99 <.001*** 4.12 <.001*** 
Annihilation 2.68 [2.30, 3.07]   - 2.96 .007** 
Unsure 3.49 [3.12, 3.86]     - 
          
(b) 
Evidence 
Reincarnation 5.38 [4.70, 6.07] 1.48 .141 n.s. 6.18 <.001*** 4.07 <.001*** 
Immortality 4.80 [4.44, 5.17] - 7.05 <.001*** 3.92 <.001*** 
Annihilation 2.94 [2.55, 3.31]   - 3.22 .003** 
Unsure 3.79 [3.43, 4.15]     - 
          
(c) 
Identity 
Reincarnation 4.77 [4.06, 5.48] 2.20 .053 n.s. 5.62 <.001*** 4.16 <.001*** 
Immortality 3.87 [3.49, 4.25] - 5.12 <.001*** 2.95 .010* 
Annihilation 2.47 [2.08, 2.85]   - 2.23 .053 n.s. 
Unsure 3.07 [2.70, 3.45]     -  
          
(d) 
Memory 
Reincarnation 5.12 [4.43, 5.80] 1.59 .112 n.s. 5.35 <.001*** 3.50 .002** 
Immortality 4.49 [4.13, 4.85] - 5.64 <.001*** 2.87 .013* 
Annihilation 3.00 [2.63, 3.37]   - 2.83 .013* 
Unsure 3.74 [3.39, 4.10]     -  
 
Table 1. Estimated marginal means and pairwise comparisons for measures of (a) plausibility 
of explanation in terms of reincarnation, (b) judgment of quality of evidence supporting the 







Figure 2. Estimated marginal means for measures of (a) plausibility of an explanation in 
terms of reincarnation, (b) judgment of quality of evidence supporting the belief in 
reincarnation, ascriptions of (c) identity and (d) remembering, grouped by afterlife beliefs. 




Discussion. While on average Parfit’s Celtic warrior case was not judged to constitute 
strong evidence in support of belief in reincarnation, judgments of quality of evidence 
depended on study participants’ initial beliefs about the afterlife. For instance, those who 
believe in reincarnation (and those who believe in an immortal soul) thought that such a case 
would constitute strong evidence supporting the belief in reincarnation, while this was denied 
by those who believe that the person ceases permanently after death. A similar pattern was 
observed on a number of other measurements: how plausible an explanation in terms of 
reincarnation was taken to be, how likely participants thought it is that they would ascribe 
personal identity and remembering in such a case, as well as how often participants suggested 
an explanation in terms or reincarnation in a free text response. Furthermore, evidence can be 
weakened by making alternative explanations salient. Study participants who had a chance to 
consider alternative explanations before ascribing identity and remembering, ascribed lower 
scores. 
 
Study 2. The strategy 
 
In Study 2, I build upon a study design used by White (2015; 2016a). There are some 
differences, however. First, the task does not require the study participant to suppose that 
reincarnation can in fact occur. Second, participants are asked to create the most convincing 
strategy in favor of a particular candidate rather than simply to choose from a predefined set 
of candidates. Third, the strategies can rely only on what is observable (thus, for instance, 
memory claims rather than presence of memories themselves). Furthermore, I check how 
different aspects of memory claims (level of detail, availability of information, type of 
remembering) contribute to how convincing the memory claim is taken to be. 
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Participants. 100 study participants were recruited on Prolific. 51% female, 44% 
male, remaining 5% chose ‘non-binary / other’, Mage = 32.0, age SD = 11.6, age range 18-76. 
 
Materials. Study participants were given the following task: 
 
Imagine that it is the middle of the 19th century and you are a secret operative 
sent to a far-away country on a secret mission. Your mission is to make sure 
that a tribe that lives in one of the valleys does not interfere with the business 
people from your home country building railroads and mines in the territory 
adjacent to the tribe’s territory. You were given this mission because thirty 
years ago you spent several years with this tribe, learned its language and 
traditions. You knew the chief of the tribe well; you know a lot about his life, 
appearance, character. You also know that the chief died from an arrow shot 
into his heart. 
You realize that if your mission fails and you do not manage to convince the 
tribe to cooperate, your country will use its army against the tribe and the 
whole tribe is likely to perish. 
After thorough analysis, you come to the conclusion that the only way to 
secure the support of the tribe is to convince them that your close associate 
(who was born in this tribe, but kidnapped and raised by a neighboring tribe) 
is the reincarnated tribal chief. In this tribe, everyone believes that people 
reincarnate after they die and also that the tribe should be governed by the 
reincarnate of the previous chief. If the tribe can be convinced that your 
associate is the true reincarnation of the deceased chief, your associate will 
become the new chief and you will secure the tribe’s cooperation. 
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Now you need to come up with the best way for your associate to convince the 
tribe that he is the true reincarnation of the deceased chief. 
 
Participants then were asked to answer the following two question (one or two 
sentences each): 
 
What advice would you give to your associate on how to convince the tribe 
that he’s the true reincarnation of the deceased chief? 
Why, in your opinion, will the tribe find your suggested strategy convincing? 
 
On the next page, they were provided with a list of possible strategies (presented in 
randomized order) and asked to indicate whether they think it would be found by the tribe to 
be convincing (on a scale from 1 (Completely unconvincing) to 7 (Completely convincing)): 
 
[Tattoo] Your associate tattoos a birthmark on the chest exactly where the 
chief was shot with an arrow. 
[Memory] Your associate claims to remember various events from chief’s life 
and is able to describe those events. 
[Limp] Your associate walks in a limping manner, exactly like the chief did. 
[Jewelry] Your associate is able to recognize jewelry that was owned by the 
chief. 
[Name] Your associate claims that his name is the same as the chief’s. 
[Claim] Your associate claims that he is the reborn chief. 
[Style] Your associate has hair and clothes in the same style as the chief. 
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[Character] Your associate exhibits character traits that are exactly similar to 
the chief’s. 
 
Finally, on the last page participants received the following task: 
 
Let’s look further into the strategy “Your associate claims to remember 
various events from the chief’s life.” 
 
Which features of memory would be found to be the most convincing? 
Consider the following three pairs of features. 
 
[Availability] Event known only to very few / Event known to many 
[Level of detail] Event is described with a lot of detail / Event is described 
very abstractly 
[Memory type] Associate claims “I personally remember this event” / 
Associate claims “I just know that this happened to me” 
 
After reading these instructions, participants were asked to indicate for each of the 
eight possible combinations4 (presented in random order) whether they think it would be 
 
4 For example: 
 
Event known only to very few. 
Event is described with a lot of detail. 
Associate claims “I personally remember this event”. 
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found by the tribe to be convincing. Responses were collected on a scale from 1 (Completely 
unconvincing) to 7 (Completely convincing). 
Results. 
Free text responses. Looking at bare word frequencies in responses, “knowledge” and 
“to know” in various forms (77 instances) is mentioned three times more frequently than 
“memory” and “to remember” (in various forms, 25 instances). These results hint that it is 
unlikely possession of information rather than presentation of this information in a form of a 
memory claim that is taken to be key element in assessing evidence. 
To look into the suggested strategies in more detail, the following coding-scheme was 
applied (some participants mentioned more than one strategy): 
 
1. Strategies based on possession of information; 
2. Strategies based on possession of traits; 
3. Strategies based on possession of bodily signs. 
 
65 percent of participants mentioned possession of information, 33 percent – 
possession of traits, 7 percent – possession of bodily signs. There were also several additional 
isolated strategies, like staging a miracle, but they were not mentioned by more than one or 
two participants each. 
In the first category, it was often not possible to discern what form should 
communication of information take. Where it was presented explicitly enough, 29 
participants talked about demonstrating knowledge about the chief and the tribe while only 
11 participants mentioned that the associate should claim to have memories of events from 
the chief’s life. The fact that memories were relatively rarely mentioned may suggest that it 
was the unlikely possession of information that was thought to play the crucial role. 
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For traits, no comparable classification difficulties emerged. 24 participants 
mentioned that the strategy should involve mimicking behavioral patterns, such as 
mannerisms and a further 15 mentioned mimicking character and personality traits. 
Only 7 participants mentioned bodily signs, in all cases associated with the manner in 
which the chief died, such as presenting a scar or a birthmark on the spot where the arrow hit 
the chief or pains in the heart. 
Comparison of strategies. Mixed-effects linear regression with random intercepts by 
participant and strategy as a fixed factor showed that there were differences in how 
convincing various strategies were taken to be, F(7, 693) = 54.9, p < .001. Estimated 
marginal means for each strategy are plotted in Figure 3. Post hoc pairwise comparisons 
suggest that there were no differences in how convincing the top three strategies (Memory, 
Character, Tattoo) were taken to be, all pholm = 1.00. Second-tier strategies (Jewelry, Limp, no 
difference, pholm = .176) were seen to be less convincing than those in the first-tier (all pholm < 
.030) but more convincing (all pholm < .010) than those in the third group (Style, Claim, no 
difference, pholm = 1.00). The least convincing strategy (all pholm < .001) was Name. 
A mixed-effects model was fit with participants as a random factor, three fixed 
within-subject factors: level of detail (detailed vs abstract), availability (known to few vs 
known to many), and memory type (personally remembers vs knows) and convincingness as 
an outcome. All three factors were statistically significant predictors of how convincing the 
memory is going to be taken to be (Level of detail, F(1, 693) = 79.6, β = .97, 95% CI [.76, 
1.18], t(697) = 8.93, p < .001; Availability, F(1, 693) = 52.7, β = .79, 95% CI [.58, 1.00], 
t(697) = 7.27, p < .001; Memory type, F(1, 693) = 14.1,  β = .41, 95% CI [.20, .62], t(697) = 
3.76, p < .001. There were no two- or three-way interactions between the factors (all ps > 
.250). See Figure 4. 
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Memory type, however, was the weakest predictor of the three, weaker than Level of 
detail (z = 3.66, p < .001) and Availability (z = 2.48, p = .013). No difference was observed 
between Availability and Level of detail (z = 1.18, p = .24). 
 
Figure 3. Estimated marginal means for how convincing different strategies were thought to 
be. Error bars indicate 95% CI. 
 
Discussion. While the study confirms that accurate memory claims are taken to 
constitute evidence of reincarnation—strategy based on memory was perceived to be highly 
convincing, on a par with strategies based on mimicking the character of the deceased chief 
and also bodily marks—both free text responses and direct comparisons between the level of 
detail, availability of information about the event, and memory type, suggest that it is 
otherwise hard-to-explain knowledge of facts that plays the key evidential role. While 
memory claims in which the agent is explicitly claiming to personally remember an event 
from the chief’s life were taken to be more convincing than those claims in which the agent 
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claims to simply know that the event happened to him, this effect was considerably smaller 
than the effect of level of detail (detailed vs abstract) or availability (known to few vs known 
to many) of information contained in the memory claim. 
 
 
Figure 4. Estimated marginal means for how convincing various memories differing in level 
of detail, availability, and type of memory are taken to be (a) and parameter estimates of the 




The two studies presented in this chapter bear on the three descriptive questions discussed in 
the introduction. First, to what extent cases like Parfit’s Celtic warrior case are judged to 
provide evidence supporting the belief in reincarnation depends on prior willingness to 
believe in reincarnation and what other potential explanations are salient (Study 1). On 
average, the case was not judged to constitute strong evidence in support of belief in 
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reincarnation. There were, however, striking differences between groups holding different 
afterlife beliefs on a number of measurements: how plausible reincarnation was taken to be as 
an explanation of the case, how good was evidence for a belief in reincarnation taken to be, 
how likely participants thought it is that they would ascribe personal identity and 
remembering should they encounter such a case, as well as how often participants suggested 
an explanation in terms or reincarnation in a free text response. In all cases, those who 
believe in reincarnation scored high and those who believe that the person ceases 
permanently after death scored low. Furthermore, considering alternative explanations, some 
of which did not presuppose personal identity (telepathy, clairvoyance, artificial memory 
insertion by the technologically advanced extra-terrestrials), led participants to lower 
ascriptions of personal identity and remembering. 
Second, written responses in Study 1 did not contain any clear hints that study 
participants interpret reincarnation in a way that does not assume personal identity. 
Furthermore, a measure of perceived identity was strongly correlated with measures of 
plausibility of explanation in terms of reincarnation, r = .760, and judgments of quality of 
evidence in support of the belief in reincarnation, r = .759, both ps < .001, suggesting that the 
concept of reincarnation employed by the participants implied preservation of personal 
identity. Furthermore, in factor analysis, explanation in terms of reincarnation loaded with 
other explanations that assume the presence of the Celtic warrior in the Japanese woman: 
immortality and possession. 
In relation to the third question, the two studies collectively suggest that third-
personal evidence of reincarnation is mostly constituted by otherwise hard-to-explain 
possession of knowledge rather than that knowledge being presented in a format of a memory 
claim that stresses that the event is personally remembered. This is most clearly demonstrated 
by direct comparisons between the level of detail, availability of information about the event, 
 23 
and memory type as well as by relatively rare references to remembering in free text 
responses in Study 2. Free text responses in Study 1 also point to the fact that what was often 
taken to call for an explanation was the unlikely knowledge of facts: 26 percent of 
participants proposed explanations in terms of an educated guess, 12 percent speculated about 
other ways to obtain this kind of knowledge (testimony via family, access to authentic written 
sources, non-invasive archaeology), 13 percent entertained the possibility of sheer 
coincidence (made more palatable by pointing to the possibility that perhaps many people 
were making such claims and thereby someone was likely to guess just by luck, or portraying 
the claims made to be relatively vague). 
In summary, the extent to which verifiable memory claims are taken to constitute 
evidence of personal identity in reincarnation depends on background beliefs. Furthermore, it 
seems that when potential past lives memories are considered, the element of verifiable 
memory claims that calls for an explanation—and that is sometimes explained in terms of 
reincarnation—is the possession of otherwise-hard-to-obtain knowledge about past events 





5 At least in third-personal scenarios based on observable evidence in a form of memory claims. The role of 
memory may be different in first-personal scenarios (White, Kelly and Nichols 2016) or when presence of 
memories is stipulated in a vignette rather than inferred from memory claims (White 2015; 2016a; Woike, 
Collard and Hood 2020). 
6 I would like to thank members of the Centre for Philosophy of Memory at The Université Grenoble Alpes for 
comments on a previous version of this chapter and Phyllis Zych Budka for linguistic edits. This research has 
received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
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